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1. Introduction
For many years, the Downsian model of political equilibrium was the only
(formal) model, and it suffered from two severe limitations: it portrayed political parties,
or candidates, as being concerned only with winning elections (as opposed to
implementing particular policies), and it possessed equilibria only (roughly speaking)
when the policy space was unidimensional, and preferences were single-peaked. In the
mid-1990’s two pairs of authors proposed, independently, a new model of political
equilibrium which remedied both of these problems. The model was originally proposed
by Osborne and Slivinski (1996), who dubbed it the ‘citizen-candidate model’, and later
formulated to apply to environments with multi-dimensional policy spaces by Besley and
Coate (1997).
In the citizen-candidate (CC) model, citizens have preferences over a policy
space. Each citizen considers whether or not to stand for election. If a candidate enters
the contest, she pays a cost, and if she wins, she enjoys a benefit from holding office, as
well as deriving utility from implementing the policy upon which she ran. It is assumed
that , if a candidate stands for election, she must announce her ideal policy; to do
otherwise would not be credible in this one-shot game. The model generally possesses
pure-strategy equilibria with a small set of candidates, even when the policy space is
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multi-dimensional. Thus, both limitations of the Downs model are overcome, because
candidates are explicitly ‘ideological,’ as well as caring about the spoils of office, and
equilibria exist.
In this note, I study the set of CC equilibria in what might be called the canonical
spatial model, where citizens have preferences defined on a Euclidean policy space, and
where, except for the utility derived from winning office, all citizens care only about
policies, not about the personalities of candidates. (This is thus a special case of the
Besley-Coate (BC) environment.)

More precisely, the model is ‘canonical’ in that there

is a continuum of citizen types ( this being the standard way of formalizing the notion
that polities are large and citizens are very heterogeneous), and they are distributed
according to a continuous probability measure on the space of types.
The authors who proposed the CC model worked in an environment of certainty:
uncertainty as to the electoral outcome existed only when there were voters who were
indifferent between announced policies or when the plurality winner was non-unique. I
want to avoid the knife-edge peculiarities of electoral models with certainty, and so I will
introduce uncertainty in electoral outcomes in a standard way.
I will study the set of 2-candidate CC equilibria in the canonical model. Such an
equilibrium is characterized by a pair of policies. Let T be the policy space; then the
manifold of equilibria is a subset of T x T. I will argue that the canonical model suffers
from an indeterminacy of equilibrium, in the sense that the equilibrium manifold can
comprise an open set in T x T. In other words, the dimensionality of the equilibrium
manifold is the same size as the dimensionality of T x T.
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It is probably too much to ask, of a concept of political equilibrium for multidimensional policy spaces, that its political equilibria (1) always exist and (2) be locally
unique (i.e., the dimension of the equilibrium manifold be zero).

The concept of

party-unanimity Nash equilibrium that I have proposed (Roemer [2001]) generally
exists, and is always a two-dimensional manifold in T x T, regardless of the dimension of
T. But it is probably the case that an equilibrium concept is insufficiently restrictive if it
allows the equilibrium manifold to be of the ‘same size’, in the sense of dimension, as the
parent space.

2. A canonical spatial model
There is a continuum of citizen types, h ŒH, distributed according to a
n
probability measure F on H. There is a policy space T Ã R , some n >1, that we take to

be a compact, convex set. The von Neumann- Morgenstern utility of type h on T is
given by the vNM utility function v(⋅,h):T Æ R .
We assume that there is a representative agent for each type; we denote the
representative agent for type h also by h. The set of representative agents plays the game
described in Besley and Coate (1997).

If a candidate enters the electoral contest, he

pays a cost of d; if a candidate wins the election, he enjoys a utility supplement of b.
Except for these two numbers, all citizens are entirely policy oriented; that is, a citizen of
type h derives a utility of v(t,h) from the implementation of t, regardless who the
implementor is.
We introduce uncertainty in voting as follows. Given any two policies t1,t 2 ŒT ,
define the set of types who prefer t1 to t2 as:
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W(t1 ,t 2 ) = {h | v(t1 ,h) > v(t 2 ,h)}.
We assume that v and F are such that, if two policies are distinct, then only a set of types
of measure zero is indifferent between them. It therefore follows that, if all citizens vote
their preferences, the fraction who would vote for t1 in a contest between t1 and t2 would
be F(W(t1 ,t 2 )) . In a two-candidate election, uncertainty would only exist as to the
outcome if this fraction were exactly one-half. We now say, however, that this predicted
vote share is subject to a margin of error, and so there is only a probability that t1 wins
the election, which is an increasing function of the predicted vote share. To avoid
complexities that add nothing to the argument, I will assume henceforth that, in any
election (among any number of candidates), the probability of victory for a candidate is
equal to predicted vote share of her policy.
We assume, following BC, that candidates must announce their ideal policies.
We denote the ideal policy of type h by th.
Thus, the data of the model are (T, H ,F,v,b,d) .
We now state the definition of a pure strategy 2-candidate CC equilibrium. It is a
Nash equilibrium played by the set of type- representatives, where each chooses either to
enter or not to enter the electoral contest, and each wishes to maximize her expected
utility. (Readers are referred to BC for more detail.)
There are two sets of inequalities that characterize an equilibrium. The first (
inequalities (4) of BC) state that the expected utility of each candidate will weakly
decrease, if he contemplated not to run; and the second says that the expected utility of
any type who is not a candidate would weakly decrease, if he contemplated to run
(inequalities (5) of BC).
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Let (h1 ,h2 ) be a 2-candidate CC equilibrium. Then these two sets of conditions
may be written as:

p1 (v(t h 1 ,h1 ) + b) + p 2 v(t h 2 ,h1 ) - d ≥ v(t h 2 ,h1 ) ¸
Ô
p1v(t h 1 ,h2 ) + p 2 (v(t h 2 ,h2 ) + b) - d ≥ v(t h1 ,h2 )ý
Ô
þ

(A)

and
h

"h œ{h1,h2 } p 1v(t 1 ,h) + p 2 v(t 2 ,h) ≥ p1* (h)v(t 1 ,h) + p *2 (h)v(t 2 ,h) + p *h (h)v(t ,h) - d (B)
h

h

h

h

where p1 and p2 are the probabilities that h1 and h2 win in the contest between them, and

p *i (h) is the probability that hi wins, for i =1,2 in the 3-candidate election among
*

{h1 ,h2 ,h} , and p h (h) is the probability that h wins in that election.

We now specialize to the case of Euclidean preferences, and take T to be a
compact, convex set in R2. The set of types is H=T, and the utility function is
v(t,h) = -d th

where dth means the distance from t to h.

F can be any continuous probability measure

on H. Denote, for easier reading, d12 ≡ dh1 h 2 . Of course , the ideal policy of h is t=h.
Using the facts that p1 = 1- p 2 and dhh= 0, we can rewrite the two inequalities of
(A) as:
for i = 1,2

p i (b + d12 ) ≥ d

(A')

while inequalities (B) may be written as:

for all h œ{h1 ,h2 } d ≥ bp*h (h) + (p1 - p1* (h))d1h + (p 2 - p *2 (h))d2h .

3. An example with a large set of equilibria

(B')

6
Because preferences are Euclidean, the set W(t1 ,t 2 ) is easy to characterize: it is
the set of types that lie on the same side of the perpendicular bisector of the line segment
joining t1 and t2 as t1 lies. In a 3-candidate race among {h1 ,h2 ,h} , the set of types
preferring h to the other two policies is W(h,h1 ) « W(h,h2 ) . Thus, in the 3-candidate race,
the probabilities of victory are, by our convention:
p1* (h) = F (W(h1 ,h) « W(h1 ,h2 ))
*

p 2 (h) = F(W(h2 ,h) « W(h2 ,h1 ))
p *h (h) = F (W(h,h1 ) « W(h,h2 ))

Now choose any pair of types {h1,h2} such that:

p1 = p 2 =
and

1
2

(1)

m ≡ sup p *h (h) <
hœ{h 1 ,h 2 }

1
.
2

(2)

The second inequality says that no other type can expect to win at least half the votes,
should she enter the race with the first two: these conditions are easy to satisfy.
Essentially, they require that h1 and h2 be not too similar and not too extreme.
Denote:
M ≡ sup (hœ{h1 ,h2 }

d12
1
1
+ ( - p1* (h))d1h + ( - p *2 (h))d2h );
2
2
2

M is finite because T is compact. Now choose b large enough (and positive) so that:

1
b( - m) > M
2

(3)

which is surely possible by virtue of (2), and choose e>0 small enough so that:
1
b( - m) - e > M
2
1
(b + d12 ) - e > 0
2

(4a)
(4b)
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which is surely possible by virtue of (3). Now define:

1
d = (b + d12 ) - e
2

(5)

which is positive by (4b).
I now claim that {h1,h2} is a CC 2-candidate equilibrium for the polity
(T, H ,F,v,b,d) . We need to verify inequalities (A’) and (B’). Inequalities (A’) both

become

1
(b + d12 ) ≥ d
2
which is true in virtue of (4b) and (5). Indeed, since e>0, both inequalities in (A’) are
strict. Inequalities (B’) become:

1
1
1
*
*
*
(b + d12 ) - e ≥ bp h (h) + ( - p1 (h))d1h + ( - p 2 (h))d2h
2
2
2
which can be written:

1
d
1
1
*
*
*
"h œ{h1,h2 } b( - p h (h)) - e ≥ - 12 + ( - p 1 (h))d1h + ( - p 2 (h))d2h
2
2
2
2
which is implied by :

1
b( - m) - e > M,
2
our inequality (4a). Indeed, since (4a) is a strict inequality, we have that the continuum
of inequalities (B’) are boundedly strict: that is, for the whole continuum
h ŒH \ {h1 ,h2 } , the inequalities hold at least with some fixed, positive tolerance.

Because, given our choice of (b,d), the inequalities in (A’) are strict, and the
inequalities in (B’) are boundedly strict, it follows by the continuity of v and F, that there
is an open neighborhood of (h1 ,h2 ) in H everyone of whose points comprises a 2candidate CC equilibrium for the polity (T, H ,F,v,b,d) . (It is necessary to note that the
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probability function is continuous except at points where two candidates propose the
same policy. But that never happens in these equilibria.)

This follows because, in a

small open neighborhood of (h1 ,h2 ) , the inequalities (A’) and (B’) will continue to hold.

4. Conclusion
I have shown that, in a canonical model of electoral politics – the Euclidean
spatial model with a continuum of types – the dimensionality of the manifold of 2candidate citizen-candidate equilibria is the same size as the dimensionality of the crossproduct of the policy space with itself, which is the space in which the equilibria live. I
contend that this means that the citizen-candidate equilibrium concept is insufficiently
restrictive.
There are other examples where equilibrium concepts deliver very large sets of
equilibria: one thinks of the core of a finite exchange economy, which is also, typically,
of the same dimension as the space in which the core allocations live. For that reason,
the core is an insufficiently restrictive equilibrium concept for a finite economy.
Indeed, the core shrinks to a small set of allocations in continuum economies. That does
not seem to be case with the citizen-candidate concept.

